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Abstract
The Indochinese refugee movement cast a long shadow 
over subsequent resettlement operations. UNHCR has since 
asserted greater leadership, with resettlement becom-
ing more individually focused and globally diverse, but 
also more complex. Canadian policy has also evolved to 
become increasingly focused on protection and supportive 
of UNHCR’s durable solution activities. 
This article seeks to compare UNHCR and Canadian 
resettlement selection policy and practice in place during 
the time of the Indochinese movement up to mid-2015. It 
highlights key elements in the evolution of UNHCR and 
Canadian resettlement policy and the factors behind them. 
It also identifies aspects of the Indochinese movement that 
are relevant to contemporary refugee policy.
Résumé
Le mouvement indochinois des réfugiés a exercé une 
influence profonde sur les initiatives subséquentes de réins-
tallation. Le HCR s’est affirmé davantage à la suite en tant 
que chef de file dans ce domaine, avec une approche à la 
réinstallation de plus en plus individuelle ainsi que diver-
sifiée à l’échelle mondiale, mais aussi plus complexe. Les 
politiques canadiennes ont également évolué vers la pro-
tection comme principe fondamental, ainsi que le soutien 
des solutions durables promulguées par le HCR.  
Cet article a pour objectif de comparer les politiques et 
pratiques de sélectionnement en matière de réinstallation 
de la part du HCR et du Canada à partir de l’époque du 
mouvement indochinois jusqu’à la première moitié de l’an-
née 2015. Il souligne les éléments clés dans l’évolution des 
politiques et pratiques de réinstallation de la part du HCR 
et du Canada, ainsi que les facteurs qui les ont influencés. 
Il identifie également les aspects du mouvement indo-
chinois qui sont pertinents aux politiques contemporaines 
en matière de réfugiés.  
Importance of the Indochinese Movement for 
Resettlement Internationally and for Canada
Resettlement is an important part of Canada’s response to the global refugee population. Canada has always been an immigration country, but the Immigration 
Act of 1976 for the first time explicitly included the goal of 
“upholding Canada’s humanitarian tradition by welcoming 
refugees.”1 The structure of Canada’s refuge programs was 
set out in the Act, which also ensured the engagement of 
Canadian civil society in resettlement through the estab-
lishment of a private sponsorship of refugees (PSR) program. 
However, Canadian resettlement has undergone a series of 
revisions and updates from the time it came into force in 
1978 until mid-2015. The changes were sometimes linked to 
larger reform measures, but at other times made in isolation. 
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNHCR.
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The refugee protection environment has undergone con-
tinuous change over this same period, with new challenges 
in forced displacement, a litany of new conflicts, entrench-
ment of conflicts that began decades ago, and the increased 
inability to find solutions. Resettlement has been presented 
as one means to address some of these challenges. It has 
also been presented in some schemes as a legal pathway to 
respond to mixed migration flows.
Resettlement functions as a tool of protection, providing 
a durable solution and international responsibility-sharing 
and is one piece within a broader protection regime.2 Under 
the auspices of the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it has undergone refine-
ment and reinvigoration since the time of the Indochinese 
movement. This article follows the evolution in both UNHCR 
and Canadian resettlement selection policy from the time 
of the Indochinese movement to mid-2015. It highlights key 
developments and notes how some elements from the Indo-
chinese era are once again relevant.
The resettlement of Indochinese refugees was a defining 
movement for refugee resettlement, both internationally and 
for Canada. Almost two million Indochinese were resettled 
between 1975 and 1997 from countries of first asylum and 
through orderly departure programs (legal emigration from 
the source country).3 Canada alone resettled over 200,000 
Indochinese during this period.4 The offers of large-scale 
resettlement ultimately brought an end to the pushback of 
Vietnamese boats and ensured those fleeing Vietnam access 
to asylum.5 While the vast majority went to the United 
States, Canada, Australia, or France, a large number of 
countries were involved in resettling Indochinese refugees.6 
Their collective efforts demonstrated the ability of states to 
work together to resolve a large-scale refugee crisis through 
resettlement. With the establishment of the Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (CPA),7 resettlement became part of a protec-
tion framework that included refugee status determination, 
resettlement of recognized refugees, returns of refused asy-
lum seekers, and an orderly departure program.
The movement also highlighted some of the critiques of 
resettlement. The availability of resettlement was viewed by 
1988 as a “pull factor” involving both refugees and economic 
migrants.8 Although there were other refugees around the 
world with needs for serious protection and durable solu-
tion that could have been resolved through resettlement, this 
durable solution was virtually reserved for the Indochinese, 
as it was not until 1993 that Vietnamese made up less than 
half of all those resettled globally.9 The reality that those 
being resettled were fleeing communist states was consist-
ent with the critique that resettlement was effectively a Cold 
War instrument.10 The perceived automatic resettlement of 
Indochinese asylum-seekers arriving over many years led 
to a malaise about resettlement inside UNHCR. Many staff 
began feeling that although this movement enabled access 
to asylum, UNHCR’s work in resettling Indochinese refugees 
was more akin to that of a travel agency than a protection 
agency.11 
For Canada, the Indochinese movement was well timed. 
A decade earlier Canada had removed race as a factor in 
immigration selection and had signed the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The implementation 
of the 1976 Immigration Act introduced a more transpar-
ent resettlement framework. It also enabled the creation of 
designated classes,12 giving Canadian officials the ability to 
apply a lower threshold in selecting members of a designated 
group for resettlement. In Canada, individuals and groups 
were so moved by the plight of the Indochinese that they 
not only advocated for government action, but also organ-
ized a public response encouraging Canadians “to rescue” 
the Indochinese through the private sponsorship program. 
This movement was facilitated by an interested media and 
a government who welcomed the opportunity to tap into 
the public concern of Canadians.13 The spirit of volunteer-
ism and the large numbers eventually resettled to Canada 
were recognized in 1986 when the “People of Canada” were 
awarded the Nansen Medal, the only time the medal has 
been awarded to the people of a country.
The Evolution of Resettlement and UNHCR’s 
Increased Leadership Role 
In the decades prior to the Indochinese movement, the 
international community already had experience work-
ing together to offer resettlement as part of the response 
to a select number of refugee crises, mainly in Europe. As 
noted, while the Indochinese refugees dominated resettle-
ment internationally for some time, the view of resettlement 
evolved while this movement was effectively winding down. 
This was noted in the 1994 evaluation UNHCR undertook to 
review the implementation of its resettlement policy and 
practice:
The scale of resettlement activities has changed dramatically 
over the last decade and a half. In 1979, at the peak of the refugee 
outflows in South East Asia, resettlement was viewed by most, 
if not all parties concerned, as the only viable durable solution 
for approximately 1 in 20 of the world’s 5–6 million refugees. In 
1993, this ratio had fallen dramatically to just 1 in 400. Despite a 
quadrupling of the world’s refugee population in the interim, this 
represents a significant drop in the absolute number of UNHCR 
cases being resettled, from over 200,000 a year in the late 1970s to 
50–60,000 a year in the mid-1990s. At the same time, major reset-
tlement countries have focussed their efforts on other refugee and 
refugee-like caseloads, and not those cases identified by UNHCR.14
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The evaluation underscored the fact that a large part of 
resettlement taking place globally did not involve UNHCR, 
and that state selection was not always on the basis of the 
refugee definition. Where UNHCR was involved, questions 
were raised about the quality of submissions.15 
The ideas in the evaluation set the course for resettlement 
for the next few years. While critical of UNHCR in some 
aspects, it also affirmed that governments were increasingly 
looking to UNHCR for direction on resettlement. Among 
the resulting initiatives was a reaffirmation of UNHCR’s 
leadership on resettlement with the support of resettlement 
states, including the formal endorsement of the resettle-
ment criteria outlined in the 1996 Resettlement Handbook. 
The Working Group on Resettlement and the Annual Tri-
partite Consultations on Resettlement were established as 
the forums to engage multilaterally on resettlement. Fur-
thermore, as part of UNHCR’s leadership, its headquarters 
redirected their efforts into policy oversight, training, and 
tools development.
In 1999 evidence arose concerning widespread malfea-
sance relating to the refugee status determination and reset-
tlement process in UNHCR’s office in Nairobi.16 The Decem-
ber 2001 report on the investigation conducted by the UN 
Office of Internal Oversight Services concluded that there 
was a largescale criminal network involving UNHCR and 
non-UNHCR staff who demanded and received money to 
enable refugees and others to emigrate from Kenya to Aus-
tralia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.17 
The report, which made a number of technical recommen-
dations in order minimize opportunities for malfeasance 
in the future, helped place a new impetus on resettlement 
program integrity and combatting malfeasance, including 
improved management controls and accountability.18 This 
trend continued with the establishment baseline standard 
operating procedures19 and measures to address fraud.20
These tightened controls coincided with increased state 
focus on security screening following the 11 September ter-
rorist attacks, resulting in new barriers and challenges for 
some refugees to access resettlement. It is difficult to truly 
quantify the full impact of security restrictions on access 
to refugee resettlement, since resettlement is a voluntary 
activity of states, and UNHCR offices may temper their reset-
tlement referrals, on the basis of which states are willing 
to consider and logistically able to resettle. Overall, it is 
clear that, following 11 September, security concerns have 
presented a significant barrier to the resettlement of some 
refugees. This was most evident in the United States, whose 
2001 Patriot Act included provisions barring persons who 
were defined as providing “material support” to terrorism, 
resulting in “thousands of refugees in need of urgent protec-
tion . . . being put on hold for the US Refugee Program due to 
the expanded definition and over-broad application of the 
material support bar.”21 
In Canada, the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protec-
tion Act (IRPA) also included a number of security-related 
inadmissibility provisions. Section 34—which bars indi-
viduals who are “a member of an organization that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or 
will engage in acts”22 “of subversion against a democratic 
government, institution or process as they are understood 
in Canada”23—was a concern for advocates, since the related 
screening had resulted in, at the very least, slow processing 
for some refugees being considered for resettlement.24 
Security concerns have also meant restrictions on travel 
for the safety of government officials affected their ability to 
conduct face-to-face selection of refugees for resettlement, 
the result being that some refugees cannot benefit from 
resettlement simply because of where they are located.25 
The next steps in the evolution of resettlement can be 
linked to UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International 
Protection, launched in July 2000 to revitalize the inter-
national protection regime and commemorate the 50th 
Anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The consulta-
tions engaged refugees, governments, IGOs, NGOs, and legal 
experts on the greatest challenges facing refugee protection 
at the time. The result was the Agenda for Protection, which 
was endorsed by the Executive Committee of UNHCR in 
October 2002. While not legally binding, the Agenda for 
Protection proposed six goals to guide concrete action.26 
“Goal 5: Redoubling the search for durable solutions” sought 
to invigorate all three durable solutions: voluntary repatria-
tion, local integration, and resettlement. One objective was 
“expansion of resettlement opportunities”:
• Make resettlement more available globally in terms of 
diversifying the composition of the refugees selected 
for resettlement
• Expand the number of refugees resettled overall
• Increase the number of resettlement countries 
• Use resettlement strategically27 
Strategic use of resettlement was proposed to help unlock 
solutions for a greater number of refugees beyond those 
resettled. It was defined as “the planned use of resettle-
ment in a manner that maximizes the benefits, directly or 
indirectly, other than those received by the refugee being 
resettled. Those benefits may accrue to other refugees, the 
hosting State, other States or the international protection 
regime in general.”28
A key impetus behind this initiative was increased con-
cern about the number of refugees living in protracted 
refugee situations or what was described as “warehousing 
refugees.”29 The hope was that resettlement might be used in 
combination with other solutions to provide comprehensive 
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
43
solutions to refugee situations. Canada was an important 
proponent and facilitated the Convention Plus Core Group 
on the Strategic Use of Resettlement. In June 2004 the Core 
Group released the Multilateral Framework of Understand-
ings on Resettlement as a tool to guide parties on situation-
specific multilateral agreements to design comprehensive 
arrangements in resettlement operations. 
These developments added to the pressure on UNHCR to 
expand resettlement activities by increasing the number 
of resettlement case submissions from a greater number 
of locations, while also dedicating additional resources to 
strengthen program integrity. This pressure was particu-
larly pronounced from larger resettlement countries, who 
require thousands of individual resettlement submissions 
to meet their resettlement arrivals targets—which the 
United States increasingly linked to UNHCR submissions.30 
UNHCR therefore also faced the practical challenge of mak-
ing enough resettlement submissions for states to meet their 
resettlement targets. The reality was that UNHCR resettle-
ment submissions were well below the number of spaces 
made available for resettlement. 
In order to address the realities of protracted refugee 
situations, and to expand the number of resettlement sub-
missions, UNHCR developed a group referral methodology. 
This approach is meant for situations where there are a size-
able number of refugees with a common refugee claim and 
a common durable solution need. Rather than completing 
individual Resettlement Registration Forms (RRF),31 UNHCR 
instead simply submits registration information for the 
members of the group and a “Group Profile and Proposal,” 
which outlines composition of the group, a durable solution 
and resettlement needs analysis, challenges and obstacles to 
group processing, and logistical and resource constraints. 
Through this simplified methodology thousands of refugees 
in need of a durable solution can be submitted at a time. The 
group methodology has been key not only to enable reset-
tlement countries to meet their targets, but also to resettle 
some protracted refugee populations such as groups of 
Somalis in Kenya, Myanmar refugees in Thailand, and refu-
gees from Bhutan in Nepal. Through group processing and 
by seeking out additional funding and staffing, UNHCR was 
able to increase submissions above the number of places 
made available by resettlement states. 
While increasing its submissions, UNHCR simultane-
ously changed its approach to more accurately identify 
resettlement needs. Each UNHCR operation was required to 
undertake an annual comprehensive assessment of resettle-
ment needs uninfluenced by the availability of resettlement 
spaces. Following this approach, overall identified resettle-















This revised approach made it clear that global reset-
tlement needs were far more than the number of resettle-
ment places available. Despite an increase in the number 
of countries participating in resettlement, the number of 
resettlement spaces made available for UNHCR submissions 
increased from 50,000 to only 80,000 between 2004 and 
2011.34 Given the obvious gap between needs and spaces, 
UNHCR continues to advocate for the availability of more 
places and for simplification of selection processing, and 
has kept its submissions linked closer to the number of 
resettlement spaces, as opposed to resettlement needs.
UNHCR stopped increasing the number of overall sub-
missions in 2010 because resettlement countries were not 
keeping pace. In fact UNHCR began consciously reducing 
its resettlement submissions, recognizing that the backlogs 
created when resettlement departures do not keep pace 
with submissions would lead to problems of managing 
expectations and serious frustrations among the refugee 
population identified for resettlement.
Evolution of Canadian Resettlement since the 
Indochinese Movement
While Canadian resettlement already had a long history 
of involving faith communities and ethno-cultural groups, 
the 1976 Immigration Act created the private sponsorship 
program as a new mechanism for individuals to become 
involved in resettling refugees that was separate from the 
government-assisted (GAR) program. This mechanism 
Sources: Figures for 2003 and 2004 generated from UNHCR Resettlement Sta-
tistical Database Portal, http://www.unhcrwashington.org/rststat. Figures for 
2005 to 2014 from UNHCR, UNHCR Refugee Resettlement Trends 2015 (Geneva: 
UNHCR, 2015), 24.
Table 1. UNHCR annual resettlement submission to all countries
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enabled Canadians and permanent residents to come 
together to sponsor refugees, initially as individual “groups 
of five.” A few months later, to facilitate and promote 
increased private sponsorship, the government developed 
and began signing Master Agreements (later renamed 
Sponsorship Agreements) with incorporated organiza-
tions.35 These organizations, initially mainly faith groups, 
serve as financial guarantors, enabling the organization 
and its constituent groups to apply to sponsor a refugee(s) 
without having to demonstrate the financial capability for 
each individual application as required of a Group of Five. 
When the global Indochinese appeal was launched, the 
government collaborated with advocates in civil society 
concerned about the plight of the Indochinese refugees. 
Together they used the private sponsorship program as 
the catalyst for Canada’s large-scale response to the crisis. 
Canada effectively used a matching gift model that the gov-
ernment often uses to respond to humanitarian emergen-
cies through which the government commits to match the 
dollars donated by the public. For the Indochinese, the gov-
ernment offered a one-to-one match of resettlement spaces, 
committing a national GAR spot for every Indochinese 
refugee sponsored by a private sponsoring group (regard-
less of whether by a Group of Five or through a Master 
Agreement).36 The resulting private sponsorship response 
far exceeded initial government expectations, but the com-
mitments were met, resulting in the largest resettlement of 
any single group to Canada. While this model established 
that privately sponsored refugees should be “additional” to 
government commitments, which became core to the moti-
vation for the private sponsorship program, it also used 
the private sponsorship program as a key part of Canada’s 
national response to the Indochinese refugee crisis. 
The Immigration Act introduced eligibility and admis-
sibility (security, medical, and criminal screening) require-
ments for resettlement. The creation of the Indochinese 
Designated Class in the regulations helped make it easier for 
Canadian officials to find Indochinese refugees eligible for 
resettlement to Canada. The definition of the Indochinese 
Designated Class was
a class of persons the members of which (a) are citizens or habitual 
residents of a country listed in the schedule, (b) have left their 
country of citizenship or former habitual residence subsequent 
to April 30, 1975, (c) have not become permanently resettled, (d) 
are unwilling or unable to return to their country of citizenship 
or former habitual residence, (e) cannot avail themselves of the 
protection of any other country, and (f) are outside Canada and 
seeking resettlement in Canada.37
This test of having simply left their country and being 
unwilling or unable to return to Vietnam and having no 
other solution was much less stringent than determining 
whether the individual met the Convention Refugee defi-
nition. This made the eligibility assessment of Indochinese 
refugees much easier for Canadian officials and greatly 
increased the likelihood of acceptance. As the Canadian cri-
teria effectively matched the prima facie status given to Viet-
namese refugees up until the time of the CPA, submissions to 
Canada were simplified, and the risk of large numbers being 
refused resettlement admission was minimized. Statistics 
from the time show heavy reliance on the designated class 
for selection of Indochinese refugees. From 1978 until 1994, 
136,951 Indochinese were resettled, of which 129,105 were 
selected under the Indochinese Designated Class and only 
7,846 as Convention Refugees.38 In fact it was not until 1992 
when the CPA (which required as a precondition for resettle-
ment that the person be found to be a Convention Refugee) 
was well in place, that the number of Vietnamese selected as 
Convention Refugees exceeded the number selected under 
the Indochinese Designated Class.39 Reliance on the des-
ignated classes to meet Canadian resettlement targets was 
part of a larger trend. The majority of persons resettled to 
Canada came under the designated classes for every year 
between 1979 and 1992.40 The end of this trend may also 
reflect the fact that by the end of this period, the Cold War 
was over41and the CPA was well established.
The political changes occurring with the end of the Cold 
War necessitated a review of Canada’s designated classes, 
and by 1994 proposals were developed as a result of national 
immigration consultations. As the Immigration Act of 1976 
brought transparency and introduced independent criteria 
for the selection of who was to be resettled as a Convention 
Refugee, the changes to the designated classes established 
transparent independent criteria for selecting persons who 
may not meet the refugee definition but were in “refugee-
like” situations,42 in place of requiring the political approval 
to create or dissolve each individual designated class. The 
required regulatory changes came in 1997, replacing the pre-
vious designated classes with the Country of Asylum Class 
and the Source Country Class under the Humanitarian 
Designated Classes Regulations. Selection under the Coun-
try of Asylum Class required, among other things, that an 
applicant “has been and continues to be serious and person-
ally affected by civil or armed conflict or a massive violation 
of human rights in the immigrant’s country of citizenship 
or of habitual residence.”43 The definition was also limited to 
persons who were privately sponsored or had the financial 
ability to be self-supporting upon arrival in Canada. 
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Although regulatory changes were implemented in 1997, 
pressures to further revamp Canadian resettlement contin-
ued until 2002, when the IRPA came into effect. The most 
prominent was the Immigration and Legislative Review, 
whose report recommended revamping the protection 
framework in Canada. Among its recommendations was 
that resettlement should prioritize those “most vulnerable 
and those most in need.” Furthermore it stated, “There 
should be no requirement that applicants be likely to estab-
lish themselves successfully in Canada.”44 While the gov-
ernment did not adopt the bolder recommendations from 
the report, including that Canada should establish a single 
protection system with a single protection agency covering 
overseas and in Canada, the government did commit to “a 
more responsive resettlement program”45 by
• Shifting the balance toward protection rather than the 
ability to settle successfully in selecting refugees;
• Establishing procedures that will allow members of 
an extended refugee family to be processed together 
overseas and, where this is not possible, providing a 
mechanism for the speedy reunion of families;
• Working more closely with non-governmental organi-
zations in identifying, pre-screening and resettling 
refugees; and
• Ensuring the immediate entry into Canada of urgent 
protection cases.46
During this period leading up to the new Act, a num-
ber of forums/consultations on resettlement influenced the 
development of IRPA and the resulting regulations, and 
were part of a slow series of incremental shifts to Canadian 
resettlement.47
One example was the International Symposium on the 
Resettlement of Women at Risk hosted by Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC) and UNHCR in Toronto in 1998. 
Among the recommendations was that “resettlement coun-
tries should expedite processing of emergency cases in order 
to reduce protection risks.”48 This initiative, along with the 
existing impetus from the legislative review, was the founda-
tion for the Urgent Protection Program Pilot launched in 2000.
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 
introduced significant changes into Canada’s resettlement 
framework, changes that reflected the shift towards protec-
tion. The three categories remained—Convention Refugees 
Abroad Class, Country of Asylum Class, and Source Coun-
try Class—with the last two classes renamed the Humani-
tarian-Protected Persons Abroad classes. To facilitate family 
reunification, a “one year window” program was created, 
enabling dependent family members of resettled refugees 
in Canada to be resettled under the same program if they 
submitted an application at a Canadian mission within one 
year of their family member’s arrival in Canada.
A key change was the removal of direct access to a Cana-
dian mission to request resettlement, placing increased 
importance on UNHCR’s resettlement submissions. The 
regulations introduced a requirement that a person being 
resettled be “referred“ to Canada.49 Thus, in order to be 
resettled a person had to be referred by:
• UNHCR
• Another (designated) “Referral Organization”
• A private sponsor (i.e., already has a private 
sponsorship)
• A foreign state with which Canada has an agreement.50
While the ability to successfully establish remained 
in Canada’s regulations as a requirement for resettlement, 
the regulations introduced two exemptions to respond to 
refugees whose protection needs effectively trumped this 
concern. The exemptions are for refugees determined by a 
foreign service officer to be in “urgent need of protection” or 
“vulnerable.”
“Urgent need of protection” means, in respect of a member of the 
Convention refugee abroad, the country of asylum or the source 
country class, that their life, liberty or physical safety is under 
immediate threat and, if not protected, the person is likely to be
(a) killed
(b) subjected to violence, torture, sexual assault or arbitrary 
imprisonment, or
(c) returned to their country of nationality or of their former 
habitual residence.51
“Vulnerable” means, in respect of a Convention refugee or a 
person in similar circumstances, that the person has a greater 
need of protection than other applicants for protection abroad 
because of the person’s particular circumstances that give rise to 
a heightened risk to their physical safety.52
These definitions gave Canadian officers the means to 
surmount the ability to establish requirement53 for refugees 
with desperate protection needs. It also reflected a trend 
to be more lenient when applying the ability to establish 
requirement. This view can be seen in the operational man-
uals of the time, which urged visa officers to apply ability to 
successfully establish with a three- to five-year timeframe 
in mind,54 so there was already a focus on leniency in apply-
ing this requirement. Officers were therefore given tools to 
better respond to UNHCR referrals, reducing the prospect of 
refusals of applicants on non-protection related grounds. 
Since UNHCR’s resettlement criteria are guided by protection 
and/or durable solution need, there is no consideration of 
the applicant’s ability to establish in a resettlement country 
as a condition for a resettlement referral.55 If Canada applied 
the ability to establish criterion stringently, it could under-
mine the protection function of the program by moving 
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the focus away from those who need resettlement most. In 
addition, at an operational level, high numbers of refusals 
means a waste of resources for both UNHCR and Canada. A 
similar important development in selecting refugees on the 
basis of their protection needs was removal of the excessive 
medical demand as a barrier for the selection of refugees for 
resettlement. 
The regulatory change also facilitated creation of the 
Urgent Protection Program (UPP). While not in the regula-
tions, Canada’s overseas processing manual explains that 
Canadian missions or visa posts should ensure that UPP 
cases receive immediate attention.56 Canada has set out pro-
cessing benchmarks for missions, advising that upon receiv-
ing an emergency submission from UNHCR, the receiving 
Canadian mission should inform UNHCR within 24 hours 
whether or not it can process the application under the UPP. 
If it confirms that it can do so, it should try to complete 
the applicant’s processing (including departure) within five 
days. Although Canadian missions have seldom met these 
timelines, the UPP established a structure for Canada to 
process UNHCR emergency submissions, including expe-
dited security reviews in Ottawa, in order to facilitate the 
processing. From 2010 to 2013, 87 emergency cases arrived 
in Canada.57 
One development established outside the regulations was 
a means for Canada to undertake group processing of refu-
gees for resettlement. This model was developed specifically 
to respond to “the very practical operational difficulties 
facing Canada in terms of securing sufficient referrals from 
UNHCR and matching limited resources and resettlement 
spaces to those refugees most in need of Canada’s protec-
tion through resettlement.”58
Given its concern about ensuring sufficient referrals, 
Canada began testing group processing as a selection model. 
In 2003 UNHCR provided detailed profiles of two popula-
tions in the Dadaab refugee camps—a group of Sudanese 
Christians and Somalis from the Madhiban clan in Kenya—
for a group processing pilot. For CIC to facilitate processing 
of the group, they established two key components: “first, 
that the members of the identified group were prima facie 
Convention refugees; and second, that the prima facie refu-
gees were deemed ‘vulnerable’ and therefore, according to 
our Regulations did not need to meet the ability to establish 
criteria.”59
While this group referral project was organized in coop-
eration with Australia, the subsequent group-processing 
referrals were organized with a much larger group of 
resettlement states. The identification of the group for the 
pilot in Kenya involved UNHCR consulting locally with the 
Canadian High Commission in Nairobi before making the 
referral. While Canada was undertaking this pilot, UNHCR 
developed its procedure and forms for making a group 
referral under the group methodology referred to earlier. 
This format became the basis for a number of group refer-
rals to Canada made over several years, including Myanmar 
refugees from the Thai border camps of Mae La Oon and 
Mae Ra Ma Luang and, subsequently, refugees from Bhutan 
in Nepal. 
The efficiency of group processing for Canada was appar-
ent. Once Canadian officials effectively accepted the UNHCR 
referral at headquarters, the missions reviewing the related 
registration documents undertook preparatory work, ena-
bling teams of Canadian officials to visit the camps and 
select hundreds of refugees for resettlement within a few 
days. Working from the premise that the refugees referred 
were eligible for resettlement, interviews focused only on 
verification of the refugees’ identity and membership in 
the group and admissibility to Canada. In 2011 group pro-
cessing of Bhutanese refugees made up 20 per cent of those 
resettled to Canada under the GAR.60 
Canada also used simplified processing for select refugee 
populations. A few years after IRPA’s passage, Canada reset-
tled a large number of Afghan refugees from a number of 
countries in Central Asia through a simplified submission 
process that effectively involved UNHCR forgoing preparing 
an individual RRF but instead sharing registration informa-
tion and completing a Canadian permanent resident appli-
cation for each Afghan refugee. 
UNHCR’s guidelines on the protection needs of select refu-
gee populations also helped Canada formulate guidance 
for Canadian missions on the eligibility of select refugee 
populations, which became the basis for high acceptance 
rates. For example, Canada’s resettlement of large numbers 
of Iraqis in the years following UNHCR’s Iraqi resettlement 
appeal on 14 February 2007 was emboldened by UNHCR’s 
December 2006 guidelines on Iraqi protection needs, which 
included recommendations that “Iraqi asylum-seekers from 
Southern and Central Iraq should be favourably considered 
as refugees under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees.”61 International protection guidance has since 
allowed Canadian officers to “concentrate on the review of 
GAR on the basis of admissibility (i.e. does the GAR pose a 
security or health risk) rather than on the basis of eligibil-
ity (is the GAR an eligible refugee under Convention defini-
tions),”62 also resulting in higher acceptance rates.
Canada’s efforts to adjust its resettlement program through 
policy and operational measures made it more coherent with 
UNHCR identified resettlement needs. The positive result is 
that Canada’s acceptance rate of UNHCR referrals is generally 
around 90 per cent.63 However, UNHCR emergency referrals 
do not fare as well, ranging from 55.8 to 70 per cent from 2010 
to 2012,64 although this percentage is consistent with a lower 
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global acceptance rate for emergency cases among overall 
submissions to all resettlement countries.65
The government introduced a new round of resettlement 
changes in 2010, while overhauling its immigration pro-
grams. In March 2010, Canada pledged to expand resettle-
ment by 20 per cent by creating an additional 2,000 private 
sponsorship spaces and 500 GAR spaces (along with a 20 per 
cent increase in Resettlement Assistance Program funding) 
upon passage of the government’s reforms to the asylum 
system.66 There were subsequent regulatory and policy 
changes. One was the elimination of the Source Country 
Class, which CIC argued was “inefficient, [and] unrespon-
sive to evolving protection needs” and that its removal 
would allow for more referral spaces for UNHCR’s resettle-
ment needs at a time when UNHCR was appealing for more 
spaces.67 Nevertheless, despite the 2010 pledge to expand 
resettlement, the 2012 budget overtook this commitment, 
and instead led to the creation of the Blended Visa Officer 
Referred (BVOR) program, a hybrid program matching 
UNHCR identified cases to private sponsoring groups, and 
dividing responsibility for the financial support between the 
government and the sponsors. This enabled the government 
to reduce the GAR program without reducing the potential 
number of UNHCR referral spots at a time when UNHCR was 
appealing for additional resettlement spaces to respond to 
the global resettlement need.
At the same time the government began responding to 
concerns from service providers that the changes resulting 
from IRPA (elimination of the excessive medical demand 
and the focus away from ability to establish) was resulting 
in increased demands on settlement services.68 CIC pro-
posed to refocus Canada’s GAR resettlement program upon 
a few populations through multi-year commitments, which 
would ideally assist service providers in their integration 
program planning while also trying to limit the number 
of “high medical needs”69 cases referred by UNHCR. The 
goal was to move Canadian resettlement selection from a 
global resettlement program with a few multi-year com-
mitments that were focused primarily on protection needs 
built around two programs (GAR and PSR). In its place the 
government proposed three program streams (GAR, PSR, 
and BVOR) with “targeted, multi-year commitments” and a 
“focus on protection need and settlement capacity.”70
2015 multi-year resettlement commitments include:
• 4,000 Iraqis out of the Middle East by 2015, towards an 
overall commitment of 20,000 Iraqis, along with an 
additional commitment of 3,000 Iraqis in 2015;
• 1,000 Bhutanese out of Nepal in 2015, towards an over-
all commitment of 6,500 Bhutanese; 
• 5,000 refugees out of Turkey between 2013 and 2018 
(Iraqis and Iranians in the short term);
• 10,000 Syrians from the region in 2015–17;
• 900 Colombians out of Ecuador between 2014 and 
2017;
• 4,000 Eritreans out of Eastern Sudan and Ethiopia 
between 2014 and 2019; and
• 2,500 Congolese out of Tanzania and Burundi between 
2015 and 2018.71
Another important aspect of the multi-year commit-
ments was the engagement of the political level in determin-
ing where Canada would commit.72 While all of Canada’s 
commitments made are linked to UNHCR identified needs, 
Canada has not responded to every resettlement need iden-
tified by UNHCR. 
While the makeup and number of resettled refugees has 
been redistributed among programs, the one area of growth 
in resettlement has been outside the refugee stream through 
the development of “public policy” spaces. While the num-
bers selected through this mechanism are not entirely 
clear,73 the target for 2015 was 900–1,200 persons. Public 
policy spaces are created under the power of the minister 
to grant “permanent resident status or an exemption from 
any applicable criteria or obligations of this Act if the for-
eign national complies with any conditions imposed by the 
Minister and the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified 
by public policy considerations.”74 This tool has been used 
for persons from a variety of populations including Afghan 
interpreters who worked with Canadian forces, Tibetans 
residing in Arunachal Pradesh, and a group of Haitian vic-
tims of violence referred by UNHCR from inside Haiti. Also 
included under public policy have been “stateless” Vietnam-
ese from Southeast Asia, some of whom apparently date 
back to the time of the CPA, and/or including persons who 
have married nationals in other countries in Southeast Asia. 
The Private Sponsorship Program Evolution
As noted at the outset, the private sponsorship program 
helped facilitate Canada’s tremendous response to the 
Indochinese movement. The Private Sponsorship Program, 
like resettlement policy overall, has undergone its own 
evolution since the Indochinese movement. While the tim-
ing of the program’s creation was fortuitous, also key to 
the overwhelming response was the political will and the 
determination of advocates to engage not only the govern-
ment but ordinary Canadians in order to organize and 
form sponsorship groups. While the movement was effec-
tively implementing government policy, it also established 
“additionality” as a component of the private sponsorship 
program. Every Indochinese refugee sponsored by a private 
group ultimately resulted in an additional refugee resettled 
to Canada by the government as a result of the matching 
formula the government put in place. 
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Following the high of approximately 35,000 refugees pri-
vately sponsored in 1979–80,75 the program hovered around 
3,800–5,800 privately sponsored refugees admitted each 
year until 1987,76 and experienced another surge in the late 
1980s. This surge reflected the resettlement of large num-
bers under the East European Self-Exiled Designated Class, 
particularly individuals from Poland who were sponsored 
by Polish ethnic groups and faith communities in Canada. 
This was part of a general trend of fewer private sponsor-
ship cases being identified by visa officers, with sponsors 
instead responding directly to requests for resettlement 
from persons overseas who were either identified by family 
or friends in Canada or from partner organization overseas. 
By the end of the 1980s both the government and NGOs rec-
ognized strains on the private sponsorship program. “The 
dramatic increase in numbers (from 7,621 in 1987 to 21,212 
in 1989) challenged the government’s planning and manage-
ment systems. The program that began as an imaginative 
and flexible partnership between the private sector and the 
government was, by 1990, beginning to experience mistrust 
on both sides.”77
In 1990 the government undertook a comprehensive review of the 
PSR program.78 While there were a subsequent number of reports, 
recommendations, and new forums for consultation during the 
1990s, this period also demonstrated the program’s flexibility to 
respond to time-limited special initiatives. These include Project 
FOCUS Afghanistan implemented with the Ismaili community 
between 1994 and 1998, the Special 3/9 Sponsorship Pilot Program 
in response to a UNHCR appeal for resettlement of refugees from 
the former Yugoslavia, and the Sierra Leone Blended Sponsorship 
Pilot—with the government providing the sponsored refugees 
four months’ financial assistance and the sponsors providing the 
remaining eight months’. However, the most significant initiative 
was the sponsorship of 5,000 evacuated refugees from Kosovo in 
1999. The media attention and outpouring of willingness to assist 
Kosovar refugees was the largest public involvement in resettle-
ment since the time of the Indochinese. All of these special initia-
tives in the 1990s involved slight adjustments to the private spon-
sorship program, which spoke to its agility and the willingness 
of the volunteers involved to respond to new needs and realities. 
The following decade saw technical changes in the pro-
cessing of sponsorship submissions, but the same issues 
that had plagued the private sponsorship program, includ-
ing slow processing and backlogs, continued to concern 
sponsors. 
CIC began proposing in 2006 that sponsors voluntarily 
control the number of applications submitted at missions, so 
that missions could clear out their backlogs, since the num-
ber of sponsorship applications in the system far exceeded 
mission targets.79 However, in 2011 the government imposed 
caps on private sponsorships at the Canadian High Com-
mission in Nairobi, where the mission backlogs were most 
acute, and in 2012 the government enforced limitations by 
placing caps on overall submissions by Sponsorship Agree-
ment Holders. The government also implemented regula-
tory changes in 2012 restricting groups of five to sponsoring 
only recognized refugees,80 thus effectively limiting their 
submission levels. Despite efforts to control backlogs and 
processing delays, this problem continued, part of which 
was associated with the initial establishment of a central 
processing office for private sponsorship applications.
The private sponsorship program received increased 
political attention after the 2006 election. While the gov-
ernment worked to control the number of new applica-
tions, the refugee reform package led to increased annual 
targets for the private sponsorship program. At the same 
time, the private sponsorship program was increasingly 
included as part of the government’s overall response to 
refugee needs. While private sponsors on their own ini-
tiative were involved in sponsoring Palestinians ex-Iraq81 
in response to UNHCR’s appeal, private sponsorships were 
Canada’s response to UNHCR’s resettlement appeal for the 
refugee population displaced by the “Arab Spring” in Libya 
who fled to Tunisia. Canada’s multi-year resettlement com-
mitments incorporate private sponsorship admissions. For 
example, Canada’s pledge to resettle 1,300 Syrian refugees in 
2013–14 committed private sponsors to resettle 1,100 of this 
total, with the national GAR program allocating spaces for 
only 200 Syrians.82 Private sponsorships were also a part of 
Canada’s January 2015 pledge to resettle 10,000 Syrian refu-
gees between 2015 and 2017. In addition, the BVOR program 
was founded on the expectation that private sponsors take 
on part of the cost of resettling refugees referred by UNHCR. 
Legacy of the Indochinese Movement and Today’s 
Challenges
Since the time of the Indochinese movement, resettlement 
has become much more complex and resource-intensive, 
and has also gained international legitimacy as it has 
become more responsive to global protection needs. The 
number of countries committed to regularly resettling refu-
gees referred by UNHCR continues to grow. Despite the fact 
that only a small percentage of refugees are resettled each 
year, resettlement has been given greater importance as a 
legal migration pathway in response to some of the greatest 
challenges facing the international protection regime. The 
most recent example, at the time of writing, is UNHCR’s goal 
of resettling 10 per cent of the Syrian refugee population.83 
Canada has remained a key resettlement player over 
successive governments. The changes introduced with the 
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adoption of IRPA in 2002 recognized the humanitarian nature 
of refugee resettlement, diminishing the need for refugees to 
demonstrate that they could “establish” themselves, and no 
longer excluding refugees on the basis of “excessive medical 
demands.” In effect, Canada’s post-IRPA selection strategies 
mirrored UNHCR initiatives to respond more effectively to 
identified resettlement needs. However, while selection bar-
riers diminished, this period saw the beginning of increased 
attention to security admissibility requirements. 
Yet the removal of barriers that represented a more “open 
door” policy for high-needs cases following IRPA led to 
internal concerns about managing the number of resettle-
ment cases with high medical or other settlement needs. 
One key to the Indochinese movement’s operational suc-
cess was the simplicity of eligibility assessments and process-
ing. In recognition of the global value of this durable solu-
tion, there is a current push to regain some of this simplicity. 
UNHCR continues to engage with states to simplify resettle-
ment submissions, given the amount of work that can go into 
documenting a single submission.84 Greater simplicity is 
required if this solution is to be expanded significantly. 
Although the surge of public interest in assisting refu-
gees in the latter half of 2015 raised the profile of private 
sponsorship once again, the private sponsorship program 
has continued to engage Canadians in the resettlement 
of refugees since the Indochinese movement. Through it, 
hundreds of thousands of refugees have been resettled to 
Canada. The Conservative government made changes to 
bring the program into greater coherence with the govern-
ment’s overall direction on resettlement. It more directly 
linked the program to Canada’s choice of priority popula-
tions and responses to current resettlement needs, similar 
to the Indochinese era. However, these adjustments, along 
with efforts to manage the backlogs that have crippled the 
private sponsorship program, also partially compromised 
the additionality value that the program brought to Cana-
da’s collective resettlement effort. 
Even prior to the 2015 federal election campaign, reset-
tlement had become more visible in political debates, and 
the political level of government appears more engaged in 
resettlement’s direction and management. It is recognized 
that involvement of the political leadership during the Indo-
chinese movement enabled the creation of the Indochinese 
Designated Class and, more importantly, sped approval to 
increase Indochinese arrivals. Canada’s move away from rely-
ing on designated classes to select refugees for resettlement 
in the 1990s was nevertheless welcome, since this approach, 
along with the changes surrounding IRPA, made Canada’s 
resettlement programs more responsive to needy refugees 
around the world instead of focused on select populations. 
However, starting in the years of the Conservative govern-
ment, Canada’s focus on multi-year commitments to select 
populations allows the political level to play an increased 
role in the decisions on who should be resettled, as it decides 
which UNHCR identified needs to prioritize. The former gov-
ernment also created a public policy component to Canada’s 
overall humanitarian program, a new area in resettlement 
through which the political level is able to offer resettlement 
to a population that does not meet the refugee definition. 
Lessons from the Indochinese experience remain relevant 
to this day. It is a foundation for contemporary resettlement 
and offered a dramatic demonstration that the public can be 
a driving force for refugees. This article has sought to provide 
an overview of the evolution of UNHCR’s and Canada’s reset-
tlement policies between 1978 and mid-2015 so as to recognize 
the key changes and interplay between the two. This is not to 
suggest that there are no other influences in broader debates 
about refugee protection, migration, and Canada’s response 
recognizing the changing global environment.
Resettlement, by its voluntary nature, reflects elements 
of diplomacy, strategy, coordination, and cooperation. 
This extends beyond UNHCR and includes all resettlement 
countries. Much of this interrelationship remains unknown 
outside of this circle. Also unknown for those outside gov-
ernment is how much security considerations affect resettle-
ment operations in eligible and operational locations. 
This article effectively ends at the beginning of a new chap-
ter in Canadian resettlement. Interestingly the Indochinese 
movement of the late 1970s appears to be the closest parallel 
to the resettlement of Syrians taking place in 2015 and 2016. 
It is not yet clear what the “new normal” will be for Canada’s 
resettlement program, recognizing that Canada’s 2016 reset-
tlement admission target of 44,800 persons85 is the largest 
since the Immigration Act of 1976, and the government has 
not indicated its resettlement admission plans at the time of 
writing for 2017 and beyond. While much has changed, there 
are key parallels and contrasts between the Indochinese and 
Syrian resettlement movements in a variety of areas, includ-
ing scale, political leadership, public opinion, public engage-
ment, and overseas and domestic operational practices, 
which will no doubt be the subjects of future examination. 
The reality that the private sponsorship program, as a model, 
is the subject of increased interest86 shows that the lessons of 
the Canadian resettlement experience are not simply impor-
tant for Canada but for other countries as well. 
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